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Patents and the Global Diffusion of New Drugs
By IAIN M. COCKBURN AND JEAN O. LANJOUW AND MARK SCHANKERMAN
Analysis of the timing of launches of 642 new drugs in 76 countries dur-
ing 1983-2002 shows that patent and price regulation regimes strongly
affect how quickly new drugs become commercially available in differ-
ent countries. Price regulation delays launch, while longer and more
extensive patent rights accelerate it. Health policy institutions and eco-
nomic and demographic factors that make markets more profitable also
speed up diffusion. The estimated effects are generally robust to con-
trolling for endogeneity of policy regimes with country fixed effects and
instrumental variables. The results highlight the important role of policy
choices in driving the diffusion of new innovations.
JEL: I15,I18,K19,L65,O31,O33,O34,O38
In 1999 lovastatin, a blockbuster cholesterol drug with annual peak sales of more than
$1 billion in the U.S., became commercially available in Egypt—twelve years after it was
first approved for sale in the United States. As we will show, this is not exceptional—
long launch lags are common and 45 percent of all new drugs are only launched in
ten or fewer countries within a decade. Since delayed launch means foregone health
benefits, it is important to understand how public policy affects the diffusion of new drug
innovations. In this paper we demonstrate that the patent and price regulation policies
governments adopt have a powerful impact on the speed at which new drugs become
available in different countries.
Promoting affordable access to new drugs is a central objective of government policy.
This poses two key challenges: providing adequate incentives for the development of
new drugs, and ensuring affordable prices of drugs once developed. Governments use
two main instruments to achieve these goals: patents and price regulation. The inno-
vation literature emphasizes a basic tradeoff between the welfare gains from stronger
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innovation incentives provided by patents and the welfare loss created by the resulting
higher prices.1 Reflecting this concern, most research on patents and ‘access’ to drugs
has focused on how the 1994 TRIPS Agreement, which mandated global harmonization
of pharmaceutical patent rights, affected prices in emerging markets (Chaudhuri, Gold-
berg and Gia (2006); Duggan, Garthwaite and Goyal (2016); Kyle and Qian (2014)).2
In the debates over TRIPS (and more recently, the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership
trade agreement), developing countries and public health advocacy groups have argued
that harmonization of patent policy is both unnecessary and harmful when viewed from
the perspective of this tradeoff. For low income countries with limited private health
insurance and poorly funded public health systems, the welfare loss involves not just the
deadweight loss from higher prices, but also the worrying prospect that large segments
of the population may have no affordable access to new drug therapies. This has led
economists to recommend alternative ways for governments to provide innovation in-
centives while maintaining low prices in developing countries, especially for vaccines
(Kremer (1998), Kremer (2002)). Moreover, the increase in innovation incentives from
having patent rights in low income countries is likely to be small for many kinds of drugs
because these countries do not account for a large part of the global market.3
This debate, however, misses a critical element: the impact patent rights and other poli-
cies have on the diffusion of new drugs. The public health benefits of new drugs depend,
first, on how quickly (if at all) drugs are launched in different countries and, second, on
how widely they are adopted within a country, once launched. Once a drug has been de-
veloped, sunk R&D costs are not relevant to the launch decision. However, the decision
to launch in any given country will be sensitive to drug manufacturers’ assessment of
anticipated profits relative to country-specific costs. These include costs of clinical trials
to secure regulatory approval and commercial costs relating to product launch, such as
establishing distribution capacity, educating prescribers, and obtaining reimbursement
from private or public insurers. These costs must be incurred in every country in which
a drug is launched: outside tightly integrated trading blocs such as the European Union,
there are few international protocols that recognize regulatory approval of drugs across
borders, and limited economies of geographic scope in distribution. Moreover, it is likely
that the bulk of these entry costs would apply whether the first entrant in a country is the
original innovator, its licensee or a generic imitator.
Of course, if these costs were negligible, diffusion would be driven exclusively by
1The classic statement is Arrow (1962), which spawned a huge literature. Empirical studies of the impact of patent
rights on the rate and direction of innovation are more recent, and include Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001), Moser
(2005), Qian (2007), Kyle and McGahan (2012), Williams (2013), Galasso and Schankerman (2015), and Budish, Roin
and Williams (2013).
2TRIPS is the acronym for the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, which is admin-
istered by the World Trade Organization. Sell (2003) discusses the political economy of TRIPS and other international
trade-related agreements. Grossman and Lai (2004) provide a theoretical analysis of patent regimes in a trading world
economy with different market sizes and capacity for innovation.
3An important exception to this are drugs for ‘neglected diseases’ whose burden falls disproportionately on the pop-
ulation of low-income countries. With little or no market for these drugs in high-income countries, the strength of
intellectual property rights in emerging markets could play a larger role in innovation incentives (Lanjouw and Cockburn
(2001)). However, patents are not the only way to provide incentives to do R&D in these areas, e.g. the transferable
Priority Review Voucher mechanism now implemented in the USA (Ridley, Grabowski and Moe (2006)).
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heterogeneity in demand side factors affecting the benefits of adoption in different coun-
tries. This is the perspective emphasized in the economics literature on diffusion, begin-
ning with the seminal work by Griliches (1957). But if the sunk investments required to
enter and penetrate new markets are significant, the diffusion of new technologies will
also be influenced by policies that affect profitability of suppliers in different markets,
including patent rights. This supply-side perspective is at the heart of economic models
of entry (e.g., Bresnahan and Reiss (1987); Holmes (2011); Collard-Wexler (2013)), and
has been underappreciated as a factor limiting diffusion of innovations across different
markets. Of course, the potential role of patent rights in promoting global diffusion of
innovation is not limited to pharmaceuticals, but they are a good case study both because
of their economic importance and the significant country-specific costs of launching new
drugs.
In this paper we focus on how patent and price control policies, as well as economic
and demographic factors, affect the speed and scope of diffusion of new pharmaceuti-
cal products across countries.4 The empirical analysis is based on a large data set that
covers launches of 642 new drugs in up to 76 countries during the period 1983-2002, to-
gether with information on the patent and price control regimes in these countries. More
than in previous research, the countries in our data set span all levels of economic de-
velopment and exhibit a wide variety of patent regimes. In the analysis we distinguish
between process patents, which protect of methods of manufacture, and product patents
on new chemical molecules. Process patents are considered relatively weak, as they do
not prevent competitive entry by entrants with superior manufacturing processes. Some
countries (such as India) purposefully adopted a ‘process only’ patent regime for drugs
in order to foster domestic competitive entry. Product patents are typically considered
stronger rights, blocking entry by competitive (or generic) products and allowing for
more effective appropriation of rents. The wide variation across countries, and over time
within countries, in both the duration and content of patent regimes provides the potential
to identify effects of policy choices on diffusion.
There are four main empirical findings. First, we document the limited scope and slow
pace of global diffusion of new drugs. Many new drugs become available in countries
only after long lags (often more than 10 years) from the date at which they were first
launched commercially, and many drugs are never launched outside a handful of wealth-
ier countries. Second, we show that the patent policies governments adopt strongly affect
how quickly new drug therapies are launched in their countries. Longer, and stronger,
patent protection powerfully accelerates diffusion. For example, controlling for eco-
nomic and demographic factors, moving from a regime of no product patents to a long
product patent term reduces launch lags by about 55 percent. The magnitudes of these
effects are even larger when we account for the endogeneity of patent and price control
4A launch decision in one country may also depend on policy regimes in other countries. Such ‘policy externalities’
can arise from benchmark pricing formulas (Bloom and Van Reenen (1998); Jacobzone (2000); Brekke, Grasdal and
Holms (2009); Kyle (2007)), and parallel trade that erodes price differences across country borders (Ganslandt and
Maskus (2004)). In this paper we focus on how domestic policies affect launch lags, but do not incorporate these policy
externalities. A full treatment of dynamic entry decisions across markets with spillover effects remains an important topic
for future research.
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regimes, using country fixed effects and instrumental variables. Process patents also pro-
mote faster launch, but the impact is not as large as for product patents. Short product
patents have no effect. Importantly, we show that the impact of policy regimes holds
equally for low and middle income countries as for high income countries.
Third, countries that adopt strong pharmaceutical price controls experience signifi-
cantly longer launch lags for new drugs. We estimate that introducing price controls
increases launch lags by about 25 percent, and with instrumental variables the estimate
rises to more than 80 percent. Fourth, new drugs are launched much faster in countries
that have health policy institutions that promote availability and distribution of drugs—in
particular, adopting the Essential Drug List of the World Health Organization and hav-
ing a national formulary—and these institutions do not appear to be simply proxies for
unobserved institutional quality.
Finally, we find that local market size—as captured by population, per capita income,
health expenditures, and demographic factors—has a big impact on the speed of drug
launches. These results are consistent with earlier important studies of drug diffusion
focused primarily on OECD countries (Kyle (2006), Kyle (2007)), and related research
using U.S. data showing that market size is associated with greater pharmaceutical inno-
vation and nongeneric entry (Scott Morton (1999); Acemoglu and Linn (2004); Dubois
et al. (2015)).
Previous research on patent rights and diffusion of technology has focused on two
channels, international trade and foreign direct investment. Delgado, Kyle and McGahan
(2013) show that the timing of implementation of TRIPS (compliance dates varied across
countries) is associated with increased trade flows in sectors that are IP-intensive relative
to a control group. The impact varies substantially across sectors, and is notably lower in
biopharmaceuticals (compared to ICT), where complementary resources in distribution
play a large role. Branstetter, Fisman and Foley (2006) use firm-level data to show
that royalty payments and R&D investment by multinational affiliates increase after IP
reforms were adopted in sixteen countries (some before TRIPS), and that this effect is
concentrated among affiliates of parent companies that use U.S. patents extensively prior
to the reforms. In both of these papers, the patent reforms are treated as exogenous
events.
The first important empirical research on international drug diffusion is Kyle (2006)
and Kyle (2007).5 The 2007 paper uses launch data in 28 countries (21 of which are
OECD members) from 1980-2000 and shows that price controls significantly retard the
speed of launch as well as the number of countries in which a drug is launched. Inter-
estingly, firms are also found to less likely to follow launch in a low-price country with
launch in a high-price country, possibly due to ‘reference pricing’ policies by pharma-
ceutical price regulators. In her work, the price control regime is treated as exogenous
and, due to limited time variation, country fixed effects are not used. Moreover, her pa-
per does not examine the impact of patent rights on drug launch dates, and has much
less coverage of low and middle income countries as compared to the sample we use
here. This latter point is important because critics often claim, without corroborating ev-
5See also Danzon, Wang and Wang (2005).
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idence, that patent rights are unlikely to be as important in emerging and poor countries.
Kyle (2006) analyzes a similar sample of drug launches in a smaller set of developed G7
countries, focusing primarily on how firm characteristics affect launch timing, possibly
because they are correlated with unobserved entry costs. 6 Both of these studies also
incorporate various controls for market size and demographic characteristics, and a first
attempt to control for competition by existing drugs in the market.
Two more recent important studies focus on how patent rights affect the prices and
quantities sold of new drug products. Duggan, Garthwaite and Goyal (2016) study drug
sales in India and exploit variation in the (assumed exogenous) timing of patent decisions
allowed by the Indian patent system to identify the impact of patent rights. They find a
modest average increase in prices of 3-6 percent, and little impact on quantities sold and
thus on profitability. They suggest that the impacts may be small because of the ability of
the Indian government to institute direct price controls, but they do not explicitly analyze
the effects of price regulation or the timing of launch decisions. In related work, Kyle
and Qian (2014) provide evidence on the effect of patents on prices and quantities of new
drugs, conditional on launch in 59 countries at varying levels of economic development.
Kyle and Qian identify the causal impact of patents by comparing drugs which were
‘treated’ by the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement in a given country with those
that were not affected (the difference arises from variations in the date at which a country
becomes TRIPS compliant relative to the priority date of the patented drug). Building on
the research in the current paper, they also include a selection equation for drug launch.
They find that patented drugs have modestly higher prices, though the price premium
is smaller in poorer countries, possibly reflecting price discrimination strategies adopted
by drug manufacturing firms. Interestingly, they also find that patents are associated
with higher quantities sold, possibly because patents give firms incentives to increase
investment to promote within-country diffusion, as discussed above.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I develops a simple dynamic model of drug
launches, as a framework for interpreting our empirical results. Section II describes the
data set (details are provided in the Online Appendix). Section III presents nonparametric
evidence on the geographic scope and speed of new drug diffusion, and how it varies with
patent and price regulation regimes and the level of economic development. Section IV
describes the specification of the hazard model for drug launches and presents the main
econometric results, followed by robustness checks in Section V. In Section VI we show
that the key results are robust to using country fixed effects and instrumental variables
to address the endogeneity of policy regimes. Section VII uses our parameter estimates
to simulate the impact of counterfactual policy regimes on drug diffusion. We conclude
with a short summary of key findings and directions for future research.
6It is not possible to make direct comparisons of the samples of molecules studied in the two Kyle papers with our
data because of different procedures for constructing the data sets. Overall, we are more conservative in counting drug
launches. For more discussion, see the Online Appendix.
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I. A Model of Drug Launch
Consider a firm that has developed a new drug i that can be launched in a set of
countries, denoted by j D 1; :::; J . The firm obtains a product patent on the drug in
each country at time t D 0.7 Patent protection lasts for T j periods in country j; after
which generic competition drives price to marginal cost. A launch in country j involves
a sunk cost,  i j .8 During patent protection, the firm earns flow profit in period t equal
to .xi j /!i j t , where !i j t is a profitability shock and xi j includes observable variables
driving flow profits. As detailed below, in our empirical implementation these include
market size, demographic characteristics, and policy variables and institutions including
the duration and strength of patent rights, and price regulation. For simplicity, here xi j is
treated as time invariant. In the empirics we allow xi j to change over time.
We assume !i j t evolves as an AR.1/ process
(1) !i j t D !i j;t 1 C i C  j C  i j t
where  2 .0; 1/; i and  j are drug and country-specific random effects known by the
firm, and i j t is an i id disturbance.9 The specification implies that Pr.!i j t j !i j;t 1/ is
stochastically increasing in !i j;t 1. The present value of launch at time t , conditional on
available information, is
E.Vi j t j !i j t ; i ;  j / D
T j tX
kD0
kf.xi j /E.!i j;tCk j !i j t ; i ;  j /g    i j
where  2 .0; 1/ is the discount factor. The firm launches the drug in country j when
E.Vi j t j !i j t ; i ;  j /  0. Given the AR.1/ assumption on !; the optimal entry rule is
to launch the drug when the profit shock !i j t exceeds a threshold level, !i j t (Ericson and
Pakes (1995)). This rule applies because E.Vi j t j !i j t ; i ;  j / is increasing in !i j t .
The AR.1/ specification for ! implies the following simple closed-form solution for
7This assumption simplifies the model. In practice, firms do not always seek or obtain patent protection in all coun-
tries. The assumption that the patent clock starts running at the same time in all countries is consistent with international
patent treaties which set a global priority date based on first patent application in any country. Note also that drug
launches typically occur much later than the patent application date, due to the amount of time needed for subsequent
clinical development and obtaining regulatory approval.
8The entry cost includes the costs of regulatory approval in the target country (where necessary), investment in
distribution channels, providing information to doctors and pharmacies, and securing registration on the national drug
formulary for reimbursement. These costs can vary widely across drugs and country of launch.
9The random effects allow !i j t to be correlated across countries for a given drug, and across drugs for a given country,
since E.!i j t!i 0 j t j !i j;t 1; !i 0 j;t 1/ D  2 and E.!i j t!i j 0t j !i j;t 1; !i j 0;t 1/ D  2 for i 6D i 0 and j 6D j 0.
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the entry threshold:10
(2) !i j t D
 i j   .xi j /2.T j   t/.i C  j /
.xi j /
1 Tj tC1
1 
where  D  2 .0; 1/ and2.T j  t/ is an increasing function of remaining patent term,
T j   t .
The probability that the drug is launched in country j at time t; given it has not been
launched before (the hazard rate of launch), is
h.t j Zi j t/ D Pr.!i j t  !i j t j !i j1 < !i j1; :::; !i j;t 1 < !i j;t 1/
D Pr.!i j t  !i j t j !i j;t 1 < !i j;t 1/(3)
where Zi j t  .xi j ; T j ; t;  i j ; i ;  j / is assumed known to the firm, and the second equal-
ity follows from the AR.1/ assumption on !. This implies that the hazard rate is a
decreasing function of factors that raise the threshold !i j t .
To summarize the predictions: the hazard rate of drug launch in a given country should
be increasing in factors that increase flow profit (such as the duration and strength of
patent protection, as well as determinants of market size such as population demograph-
ics, income, and health expenditures), but decreasing in factors that reduce flow profits,
such as price regulation, time elapsed since first launch, and the sunk cost of entry.
II. Data and Measurement
In this section we briefly describe construction of the data set. Details of procedures
and sources are provided in the Online Appendix.
A. Identifying drug launches
A launch is defined as the first appearance of the active ingredient of a drug (new
chemical entity) in a given country, whether in proprietary or generic form. Determining
if, and when, a new drug becomes available in a given country is not straightforward.
Since almost all countries require formal approval from a health and safety regulator
before a drug can be marketed, administrative records could potentially be used for this
purpose. But poor record keeping in some countries, lack of easily accessible public
records, and language barriers make it infeasible to track regulatory approvals for large
numbers of drugs across many countries, particularly for historical data. Regulatory
10From equation (1) and E.i j;t 0 j !i j t ; i ;  j / D 0 for t 0 > t; we get
E.Vi j t j !i j t ; i ;  j / D !i j t.xi j /
T j tX
kDt
k C2.T j   t/.i C  j /   i j
where  D  2 .0; 1/ and 2.T j   t/ D
PT j t
kD0 k
Pk 1
mD0 m . Setting E.Vi j t j !i j t ; i ;  j / D 0 yields the entry
threshold given in the text.
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approvals also do not directly track commercial availability, and formal approval is not
the same as de facto launch of a product.
We rely on a compilation of product launches obtained from a commercial market re-
search company, IMS Health Inc. This dataset tracks product launches in all therapeutic
classes in up to 76 different countries during the period 1983-2002. Product launches
were identified by IMS from a variety of sources, including regulatory approvals, an-
nouncements by manufacturers, local media reports, and IMS’ active surveillance of
distribution channels as part of other data gathering efforts. Because India was not cov-
ered by IMS during this period, we supplement this data source with information from
an Indian market research company, ORG/MARG, that tracked product launches in a
subset of therapeutic classes over the same period.
To track launches accurately, drugs must be unambiguously identified across countries.
This is not straightforward. Drugs are not always identified by a nonproprietary name,
and the generic names of chemical entities vary over time and across countries, and are
not always spelled consistently.11 Failing to recognize equivalent chemical entities in
the data would result in over-counting of new products, undercounting of the number
of countries in which a given drug is launched, and inaccurate dating of launches. As
detailed in the Online Appendix, it took considerable effort to identify drugs consistently
in these data. The source dataset has more than 180,000 observations on product/country
launches. These products contained one or more of approximately 9,600 distinct active
drug ingredients in use around the world during the sample period, for which we com-
piled more than 250,000 synonyms from a variety of reference sources. Of these 9,600
distinct active ingredients, most of which entered medical use prior to 1983, we focus on
642 clearly identifiable novel chemical entities that were first introduced anywhere in the
world between 1983 and 2002, and then identify the date when they first appear in any
product launched in each country. Importantly, to minimize over counting of drugs and
thus undercounting of launches per drug, we used a relatively broad criterion to define
equivalent products (for example, grouping together all salts and esters of a given ‘active
moiety’).12
B. Patent and price control regimes
For each country in our sample, we characterize the domestic patent regime along
four dimensions: duration of patent term, coverage of pharmaceutical products, cover-
age of chemical manufacturing processes, and an index of the strength of patent protec-
tion that reflects the degree to which patent law provisions favor patent holders versus
potential infringers (Propatent Index, which varies from zero to one). These variables
are constructed using data from Ginarte and Park (1997), Park (2008), and other refer-
ence sources cited in the Online Appendix. Since the mid-2000s patent regimes around
11For example, the drug known as acetominophen in North America is known as paracetamol in most other countries,
and is sold under more than 50 different brand names around the world.
12This procedure may ignore clinically important differences among variants of a drug that would lead a pharma-
cologist to distinguish them as different products, but it makes our results conservative in the sense that it will tend
over-estimate the number of countries in which a new drug is launched. A narrower definition of equivalent products
would generate a higher number of new drugs, with launches observed in fewer countries per drug.
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the world have converged on the ‘TRIPS standard’ (e.g., 20 year term, no exceptions
for pharmaceutical products), but there was considerable variation between and within
countries during the 1980s and 1990s.
We have no reason to believe that the relationship between patent term and hazard of
drug launch is linear. Rather than impose a functional form, we use three mutually exclu-
sive dummy variables to capture patent term duration: Short = 0 < duration  12 years
(from application date); Medium = 13  duration  17 and Long = duration  18 (the
reference category is no patent protection).13 Since the average period between patent
application and marketing approval is about 10 years (Grabowski and Kyle (2007)), a
Short patent conveys essentially no effective coverage to the patentee. We use two sepa-
rate sets of these dummy variables, one for product patents and one for process patents.
In terms of country/year observations, short, medium and long process patents account
for 10.8, 22.3 and 60.0 percent of the sample; for product patents the figures are 6.4, 16.5
and 58.2 percent, respectively. We experimented with different definitions of the cutoffs
for these patent duration categories (Short 0-10, 0-11 and 0-13; Medium 11-16, 12-16,
13-16, 13-17 and 14-16; and Long  17,  18 and  19) but the econometric results
were generally robust to these alternatives.
Countries implement price controls for pharmaceuticals using a wide variety of often
complex schemes (Jacobzone (2000), Kyle (2007)). We focus on systems of explicit
price regulation and summarize the variation across countries by coding systems as con-
stituting ‘no,’ ‘some,’ or ‘extensive’ price controls. A price control regime is labeled as
‘extensive’ if most or all drugs are regulated, rather than just a subset of the market, or
if a country’s price regulation is identified by commentators as being particularly rigor-
ous. In the sample, 22 percent of country/year observations are coded as having no price
controls, 31 percent with some price regulation and 47 percent with extensive controls.14
C. Pharmaceutical policy institutions
The observed timing of market entry reflects both the decisions of firms and the effi-
ciency of a country’s regulatory process. We capture government policies that promote
access to pharmaceuticals by coding three dummy variables for each country-year. The
first is whether a country had adopted a national formulary, where listed drugs would be
eligible for distribution through a publicly funded health system, typically more widely
prescribed, and with payment mechanisms in place. The second is whether a country had
adopted the Essential Drug List (EDL) promulgated by the World Health Organization,
which indicates that a country’s health institutions are oriented towards promoting access
to basic drugs. The third is whether a country has a formal ‘national drug policy,’ i.e. an
effort to coordinate industrial policy and domestic regulation to promote access to safe
13Where the patent term runs from date of grant rather than date of application, as was the case in the U.S. prior to
1995, we added two years to make the term roughly equivalent to one running from date of application. Results were not
sensitive to changing this assumption about the pendency period to three years.
14Price regulation regimes were coded from a variety of reports and legal texts, see the Online Appendix. Table A.2
provides information for each country in the sample on the number of years of coverage, number of drugs launched,
average percentage of drugs launched within 5 years of their initial launch date anywhere, and the product patent, process
patent, and price regulation regimes and their changes over time.
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and effective pharmaceuticals. At the start of our sample period, 65 percent of countries
had a national formulary, 41 percent had adopted the EDL and 63 percent had issued a
national drug policy; by 1997 all countries had adopted all three.
D. Demographic and income variables
We use a set of income and demographic variables to control for variation in the po-
tential demand for pharmaceuticals. These include: population size and the fraction of
population over 65 years old, real GDP per capita in purchasing power parity terms,
income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient, and health care expenditures as a
percent of GDP. We also include measures of the quality of regulatory bureaucracy and
the rule of law, both taken from the World Bank.
Many of the explanatory variables are available annually, but others are available only
periodically, in which case we use last-observation-carried-forward to infer missing val-
ues. The Online Appendix provides details and summary statistics, and a comparison of
our data construction with the approach taken by previous studies (notably, Kyle (2006),
Kyle (2007)).
III. Drug Diffusion: Nonparametric Evidence
We begin with some nonparametric evidence on the extent and speed of global drug
diffusion. Table 1 presents information on the geographic span of drug launches, showing
the distribution of the number of countries for which a launch was observed. Recognizing
that this tabulation does not account for right-censoring (some drugs may have launched
in some countries after the sample period ends), these statistics illustrate a dominant, and
striking, feature of these data: diffusion of new drugs around the world is remarkably
slow and limited. In the entire sample of new drugs, 39 percent were launched in ten or
fewer countries during the sample period, and only 41 percent were launched in more
than 25 countries. The mean number of countries experiencing launch is 22.4 (median
of 18) out of a possible 76. Even among the wealthier countries with the most developed
health care systems, not all drugs became available during the sample period: e.g., only
about 60 percent were launched in the U.S., Germany or the U.K. The fact that drugs are
not launched more widely can be due to various factors in addition to patent and price
regulation policies. In some countries, the size and demographic features of the market,
and the presence of substitutes, may limit anticipated demand to a level that does not
justify the cost of entry. In addition, demand may be limited by disease incidence, and
local regulatory practices may block approval of some drugs.
This limited geographic diffusion suggests a potentially substantial welfare loss. The
good news from a welfare perspective is that diffusion is substantially wider for higher
quality drugs—identified here as those approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA), which is among the most stringent regulatory agencies in the world (column
3), and the subset of FDA approved drugs that qualified for the priority review process
reserved for drugs with potential for significant improvement in treatment or addressing
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TABLE 1—GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF DIFFUSION OF NEW DRUGS
Percent of Drugs Launched
No. of
countries
No. of
Drugs
All
Drugs
FDA
Approved
FDA Priority
Reviewed
1-3 145 23 13 13
4-10 101 16 12 10
11-25 133 21 20 16
26+ 263 41 55 62
Note: Table shows the number of countries in which each drug is launched during the period 1983-2002, with no adjust-
ment for censoring of launch lags or for changes in the number of countries present in the data.
significant unmet medical need (column 4).15 For these drugs, more than half are even-
tually launched in more than 25 countries (though with long lags, as we will see later).
But even within this high quality subset, 13 percent of new drugs were launched in no
more than three countries within the sample period.
Because launch lags (defined as the time elapsed between first worldwide launch and
launch in a given country) can be long and the sample is truncated at 2002, Table 1 likely
under represents the true extent of diffusion. To examine the temporal aspects of dif-
fusion, and to address this potential undercounting of launches, Table 2 and Figures 1
through 3 provide nonparametric analyses of time-until-launch that estimate the distri-
bution of launch lags allowing for right-censoring. The figures plot the Kaplan-Meier
‘failure’ function (i.e., 1  OSt where OSt is the estimated survival function) while the table
reports only the time corresponding to the 25th percentile of launch lags.
Three main findings stand out. First, pooling over all drugs and countries, even after
10 years only 41 percent of drug-country opportunities for a launch were taken up. Even
after 20 years or more, less than 50 percent of possible launches had taken place, and as
practical matter, many of these drugs may never be launched in large numbers of coun-
tries. While not all of the country-years in which a drug was not launched necessarily
represent welfare losses (some drugs may have been made obsolete by advances in tech-
nology, may have no value in contexts where important complementary technologies or
resources for health care are not available, or may only be useful for treating diseases
with low incidence in a country), this evidence of limited diffusion is nonetheless disap-
pointing from a welfare perspective. Even in the subsample of FDA approved drugs, only
54 percent were launched in the average country within 10 years. Diffusion of non-FDA
approved drugs was much slower and less extensive, with 19 percent of drug-country
launch opportunities filled within 10 years.
Second, the pace and extent of diffusion is strongly associated with a country’s patent
and price regulation regimes. In the second panel of Table 2 and in Figure 1 we show
15Of the 642 drugs in the sample, 66% were approved by the FDA, and 41% of these were priority-reviewed. Dranove
and Meltzer (1994) show that FDA screening outcomes are consistent with independent measures of drug quality such as
relative sales, citations in the medical literature etc. They also show that approval times are shorter for more important
drugs.
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TABLE 2—SPEED OF DIFFUSION OF NEW DRUGS
(a) Fraction launched within
10 years (percent)
(b) Time by which 25 percent
launched (years)
All
Drugs
FDA
Approved
FDA Priority
Reviewed
All
Drugs
FDA
Approved
FDA Priority
Reviewed
Income Level
Low Income 27.1 34.3 39.4 8.98 6.99 5.99
Middle Income 39.1 50.4 50.7 4.05 3.01 2.99
High Income 46.5 61.0 63.4 2.01 1.97 1.02
Patent Regime
None 29.5 43.4 39.5 7.99 4.02 4.01
Short 33.9 42.9 43.1 6.00 4.42 3.99
Medium 35.2 47.3 47.0 5.43 3.99 3.98
Long 45.9 58.1 60.6 2.56 1.99 1.45
Price Regulation
Weak/None 44.0 56.4 58.4 2.99 1.99 1.97
Strong 37.4 49.1 50.1 4.98 3.06 3.01
Overall 41.3 53.5 55.3 3.41 2.45 2.00
Note: Table entries are based on the estimated Kaplan-Meier survivor function, which adjusts for censoring of launch
lags. Countries are categorized as Low, Middle, or High income based on the World Bank’s categories and their GDP
per capita at PPP in 2001. Based on 298,605 observations. FDA Approved subsample has 163,853 observations, and the
FDA Priority Reviewed subsample 64,778.
results broken out by a summary measure of each country’s patent regime. The duration
of patent rights is categorized as None, Short, Medium and Long (recall that we define
Short as a patent term of 10 years or less, Medium as 11 to 16 years and Long as 17
years or longer) and a country/year observation is assigned to that category if it had either
process and/or product patents in that group. With no patents, the estimated time for 25
percent of drug-country launch opportunities to be filled is eight years, falling to less than
2.6 years with long-duration patents. In the third panel of Table 2 and in Figure 2 we
group observations by strong versus no or weak price regulation.16 In countries with no
or weak price regulation, 25 percent of launch opportunities are filled within three years,
compared to five years where price regulation is strong. The estimated ‘failure’ functions
plotted in Figures 1 and 2 are very different across categories, and the log-rank test for
homogeneity strongly rejects the null of no difference across categories: 2.3/ D 750
16In regressions of the type discussed below we found no statistically discernible distinction between weak price
controls and no price controls.
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for patent regimes, and 2.2/ D 267 for price controls.
FIGURE 1. FRACTION OF DRUGS LAUNCHED BY PATENT REGIME
Note: Figure plots the Kaplan-Meier failure function for drug launches by patent regime, showing the fraction of drug-
country launch opportunities filled against time since first worldwide launch.
Finally, confirming earlier work by Kyle and others, launch delays are strongly related
to market size, as proxied by the level of GDP per capita. Measured in terms of the
estimated time for 25 percent of possible drug-country launches to take place, the first
panel of Table 2 shows that diffusion is strongly related to market size. As shown in the
first column, it takes nine years for 25 percent of drugs to be launched in the average
low income country, but only two years in high income countries. This income-related
disparity persists when we focus only on the higher quality drugs (columns 2 and 3 in
Table 2). The full distribution of estimated launch lags broken out by countries’ income
level is given in Figure 3. (Medium income includes both the lower middle and upper
middle income categories of the World Bank.)
IV. Empirical Model and Results
A. Econometric specification
To analyze the timing of drug launches more formally, and control for other covariates,
we use a parametric hazard model. A launch is defined as the first appearance of a
drug in a given country, whether in proprietary or generic form, and the launch lag is
the time elapsed since the first launch of the molecule in any country. We adopt the
proportional hazard model with the Weibull distribution, with the hazard of launch for
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FIGURE 2. FRACTION OF DRUGS LAUNCHED BY PRICE CONTROL REGIME
Note: Figure plots the Kaplan-Meier failure function for drug launches by price control regime, showing the fraction of
drug-country launch opportunities filled against time since first worldwide launch.
drug i in country j at time t conditional on no launch prior to t given by
(4) h.t j xi j .t// D t 1exi j .t/0
where t is time elapsed since the drug became "at risk" of launch, xi j .t/ is a set of time-
varying covariates and the scalar  > 0 and vector  are parameters to be estimated. This
specification imposes a monotone hazard rate, but it can be either increasing . > 1/ or
decreasing . < 1/ over time. The model in Section I predicts that the hazard rate
declines with t : since the remaining patent life falls with t; the threshold profitability
shock for launch must be larger to generate rents to cover the entry cost. The parameter
estimates of  presented below confirm this prediction.17 For continuous covariates l
corresponds to the percentage change in the per period conditional probability of launch
due to a unit change in xl (for discrete covariates, such as patent and price regulation
regimes, l is the impact in moving from the reference category to the focal regime).18
17We also experimented with a log-logistic model that is more flexible in that it can generate a distribution with a non-
monotonic hazard rate. The parameter estimates from that specification indicated that the hazard declines over time after
a few weeks. This is interesting because it suggests that, unlike in most of the literature on the diffusion of innovations,
learning about the potential profitability of markets does not appear to be an important factor for the global diffusion of
drugs. If this were the case then we should see a hazard rate that increases with time since first worldwide launch.
18With time varying covariates, the hazard function at time t is conditional on the entire sequence of covariates up
to t; call it Xi j .t/ D fxi j .s/ : s  tg. Thus the marginal impact of a covariate on the survival probability and hence
the launch lag will depend on the sequence Xi j .t/. In our later discussion of how covariates affect predicted launch
lags, we focus on the coefficients . In Section VII we use the estimated coefficients to compute the marginal effect of
covariates on the launch lag for each drug-country pair, and then average these marginal effects over pairs using their
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FIGURE 3. FRACTION OF DRUGS LAUNCHED BY INCOME
Note: Figure plots the Kaplan-Meier failure function for drug launches by country income group, showing the fraction of
drug-country launch opportunities filled against time since first worldwide launch.
Equivalently, we can interpret the negative of  (scaled by the estimated ) as the effect
of a unit change in covariates on the predicted log time until launch.
For any given drug, the hazard of launch is likely to differ across countries for reasons
other than a country’s economic and demographic characteristics and policy regime, for
example if the incidence of the relevant disease varies across countries. We address this
in three ways. First, we include a set of 14 therapeutic class dummies in all regressions.
This allows the baseline hazard rate to be different for each group of drugs. Second, in
all regressions we use standard errors clustered over the multiple observations on a drug-
country combination. Finally, as a robustness check we include random drug effects.
B. Baseline results
Table 3 presents maximum likelihood estimates for various specifications of the hazard
model. In column 1 the control variables include elapsed time since first global launch,
the set of patent and price control policy dummies, population and per capita income
to control for market size, a dummy variable for whether the drug was approved by
the FDA (as an indicator of drug quality), and a set of therapeutic class dummies. The
estimated Weibull parameter, , is 0.614, statistically different from one and stable across
specifications. This implies a declining hazard of launch, consistent with the theoretical
model.
specific sequence Xi j .t/.
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We begin with the key policy variables. The first important result is that extensive
price controls significantly delay drug diffusion. Having strong price regulation reduces
the hazard of launch by 15 percent, equivalent to a 25 percent increase in the predicted
launch lag.19 This is qualitatively consistent with, though not directly comparable to,
the findings of Kyle (2007) who uses a discrete hazard specification, a smaller set of 28
countries, and a different measure of price controls.
Second, we find that both process and product patents strongly affect launch lags.
Since the dummies are defined to be mutually exclusive within the process and prod-
uct patent categories, the estimated coefficient on Short_Process implies that, relative to
having no patent protection, a short process patent regime—such as that used by India be-
tween 1971 and 2005—reduces launch lags by 19 percent.20 Moving to Medium_Process
gives an incremental gain of 13 percent. The coefficient on Long_Process is smaller (and
not statistically significant), suggesting that long duration process patents do not support
market entry based on proprietary process innovation. (This is not clear-cut, however,
since we show later that the Long_Process coefficient is significant when we account for
endogeneity of policy regimes).
Third, we find that long duration product patents have a powerful effect on diffusion.
Short and medium product patents do not strongly affect diffusion time relative to no
patent protection, which is not surprising given long clinical development and regulatory
lags (and the fact that patents are taken out very early in the R&D process to ensure
priority). In contrast, long product patents reduce launch lags by 55 percent.21 The
results are robust to different definitions of the patent term for both process and product
patents, as discussed in Section II.22 In addition to length of patent term, the content of
patent protection also matters for diffusion. The point estimate of the Propatent Index
is statistically significant and implies that a one standard deviation increase in the index
reduces predicted launch lags by about 11.3 percent.
Turning to control variables of interest, we find that larger market size—as measured
by population and GDP per capita—is associated with faster diffusion of new drugs. The
estimated coefficients on population and GDP per capita are equivalent to elasticities of
launch lags of about -0.12 and -0.40, respectively. This finding is consistent with the
19We also tried using two separate dummy variables for weak and strong price regulation in a variety of specifica-
tions not reported here. We consistently found that weak controls have no statistically significant effect on launch lags.
Therefore, in all specifications reported in the paper we use only one dummy variable for strong regulation, and combine
country/year observations with weak and no controls as the reference group.
20The coefficient on Short_Process is identified off a relatively small number of observations: only a handful of
countries in the sample had this type of patent regime, and some for only limited periods of time, and it is possible that
the estimated effect is confounded with unobserved aspects of their internal market. One of these countries was India,
which may be a special case in terms of the size of its internal market and success in developing a highly competitive
export-oriented generic sector during this period.
21Taken at face value, this regression specification would also imply that the product and process effects are additive:
e.g., a country with Medium_Process and Long_Product would have 32.4 + 54.5 =95 percent shorter launch lags. In
fact, since the patent terms likely overlap substantially, the actual period of market exclusivity for the patent holder will
be close to the longer of the patent terms, and the impact on launch lags is better estimated by the largest of the two
coefficients rather than their sum.
22The parameter estimates are similar to those reported in Table 3. The only notable differences occur when we define
long patents as  17 years (rather than the baseline definition  18). In that case, the point estimates of the coefficients
on Medium_Process and Long_Product decline by about a third (though the differences are not statistically significant),
and the coefficient on Long_Process is now positive and statistically significant.
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conclusion of previous studies based on smaller samples of countries, and the incentive
effects of larger markets are also found in the studies of pharmaceutical innovation dis-
cussed above. Second, the coefficient on the dummy for FDA approved drugs confirms
that high quality drugs are launched much faster—their per period hazard is more than
double that of low quality drugs, and their predicted time to launch is less than half of
the lag for low quality drugs. Finally, there are significant differences in the speed of
drug diffusion across therapeutic classes. Coefficients on the therapeutic class dummies
(not reported) range from -0.81 to 0.26, equivalent to launch lags over 130 percent faster
or almost 60 percent slower than the reference category, and we strongly reject the null
hypothesis that there are no therapeutic class differences (p-value < 0.001). This holds
for all specifications.
In column 2 we examine how the composition of GDP—in particular, health expen-
ditures—affects incentives to launch, controlling for overall purchasing power. Adding
the log of health expenditures per GDP to the model sharply reduces the impact of GDP
per capita (the implied elasticity on launch lags falls from -0.40 to -0.04), but the effect
is picked up by health expenditures (elasticity on launch lags of -0.51). Importantly, the
overall impacts of process and product patent regimes are generally robust to this change
in the specification. However, the coefficient on the Propatent Index declines by about
half, and the coefficient on Short_Product patents becomes much smaller and statistically
insignificant, while Medium_Product patents significantly accelerate diffusion, with an
impact about half the size of Long_Product patents. These coefficients are stable across
a variety of specifications once we control for health expenditure.
Column 3 expands the set of controls to include the Gini index of income inequality,
the fraction of elderly in the population and three health policy institutions. The key
finding is that the coefficients on price regulation and patent regime variables are robust
to adding these new controls. Additionally, we find that drugs are launched faster in
countries with a more elderly population, and the impact is large—a standard deviation
increase in the fraction of population over age 65 reduces launch lags by 21 percent.
Moreover, for a given level of GDP per capita, the distribution of income is a significant
determinant of market entry. Greater income inequality (higher Gini) increases the speed
of diffusion significantly—a standard deviation rise in the Gini index reduces launch lags
by 23 percent. The likely reason is that greater inequality makes it more likely that there
are at least some elements in the population (the ‘wealthy elite’) that can afford to buy
the drugs.
The health policy institutions we incorporate are whether the country has a national
formulary, an essential drug list, and a national drug policy. The essential drug list and
national formulary play two roles. They facilitate distribution of drugs to the popula-
tion, which increases effective market size and thus promotes earlier drug launches. At
the same time, they signal more effective institutions for implementing any price control
regimes that may be in place, which would reduce incentives to launch. Their impact
is thus an empirical question. We find that these institutions have a large and statisti-
cally significant impact on diffusion. The point estimates imply that the predicted time
to launch is 31 percent lower in countries that have adopted the Essential Drug List, and
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an additional 16 percent lower if they have a national formulary in place.23 Adopting
a formal national drug policy has no significant impact, which may not be surprising
since, although this signals policy intent, it may not be associated with any concrete im-
plementation.24 Unfortunately, it is not possible with the available data to unbundle these
institutions and to identify the specific features that make entry more attractive. These
are important policy issues but require much more detail about how these institutions
actually function in different countries.
Finally, we examine the impact of the quality of regulatory screening on diffusion.
If regulatory quality is correlated with the choice of patent and price control regimes,
we would miss-measure the true impact of policies on diffusion speed. To address this
concern, in column 4 we include a measure of bureaucratic quality for each country/year
observation, taken from the World Bank. Since better screening is more likely to block
launch of drugs with weaker claims to safety and efficacy, we expect to see longer aver-
age launch lags in such countries. Conversely, review which is perfunctory or driven by
corruption is likely to be faster. However the impact of better screening should depend on
the quality of the drug—more effective regulators are especially likely to block low qual-
ity drugs. To test this idea, we interact the measure of bureaucratic quality with dummy
variables for whether the drug was approved by the FDA (BQ_FDA and BQ_nonFDA).
The estimated coefficients on the policy variables are robust to this extension. Point es-
timates imply that launch lags are longer for all drugs in countries with higher quality
bureaucracy but, as expected, the effect is an order of magnitude larger for low quality
drugs than for those approved by the FDA: a standard deviation increase in bureaucratic
quality increases launch lags by three percent for FDA approved drugs, but by almost 50
percent for low quality drugs.
V. Robustness Analysis
In this section we check robustness of the main results to a variety of different spec-
ifications. In each case, we introduce the changes relative to the baseline specification
given in column 4 of Table 3.
First, we introduce random drug effects to allow for unobserved drug-specific char-
acteristics such as a drug’s potential market size (e.g., differences in the incidence of
the targeted diseases) or differences in the difficulty and cost of obtaining regulatory
approval. These random effects enter as a multiplicative factor in the model for the haz-
ard function, and are assumed to follow a Gamma distribution (this standard formulation
yields a convenient analytical expression for the likelihood function). Overall the results,
presented in column 1 of Table 4, are similar to the estimates in the baseline specification.
Second, we use a more disaggregated classification of therapeutic categories, based
on the second level of the World Health Organization’s ATC classification (for example,
23We stress that this is not the effect on launch times for drugs which are listed on the EDL. While it would be
interesting to look at the diffusion rate specifically for EDL-listed drugs (given that they are considered particularly
important for basic health), there were too few additions to the EDL during the sample period to do this reliably.
24Of course, these variables may also serve as proxies for broader institutional quality in the country, though in column
4 and all subsequent regressions we include an index of the rule of law (from the World Bank). Its estimated coefficient
is rarely statistically significant, however.
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‘anti-hypertensives’ as opposed to ‘cardiovascular system’). The results in column 2,
using 61 rather than 14 therapeutic class fixed effects, are again very close to the baseline
specification.
Third, we examine whether our results for the full sample of drugs also hold when the
model is estimated using only data on the subset of higher quality drugs, as represented
by those that were approved by the U.S. FDA. Since these drugs may be especially
important for public health, it is critical to know how policy choices affect their diffusion.
In addition, an observed failure to launch may be driven by idiosyncratic variation in a
country’s regulatory environment, rather than by the profitability calculations as modeled
in Section I. Focusing on drugs approved by the FDA, one of the world’s most stringent
regulatory authorities, helps rule this out.25 The results, given in column 3, confirm that
all of our main findings hold up for this subset of drugs, with point estimates very close
to the those from the baseline specification for both price regulation and patent policy
regimes, as well as the other covariates.
Fourth, we consider differences between high income and developing countries. His-
torically there has been much less variation in patent regimes in high income countries
than in developing economies and there was (and remains) serious opposition to harmo-
nization of patent policies under the TRIPS Agreement. Opponents of harmonization on
a relatively long-duration and broad-based patent standard asserted then (and now) that
the effects of patent protection are likely to be more damaging for developing countries,
both because their capacity to innovate in drugs was lower (reducing any positive incen-
tive effects from patents) and because the deleterious price effects of patent protection
could fatally undermine the market for drugs in poorer countries. In column 4 of Table 4,
we drop high income countries from the sample. Strikingly, the qualitative results, and
most of the point estimates—in particular, the coefficients on the patent and price control
policy regimes—are very similar to the baseline specification where we use all countries.
The main differences are that the impact of population is smaller among lower/middle in-
come countries, the Propatent index is no longer significant, and the relative magnitudes
of the impact of EDL and national formularies are reversed. The important conclusion
is that the impact of patent and price regulation policies is not confined to high income
countries.
Fifth, we extend the baseline specification to allow for interactions between price reg-
ulation and patent policy regimes. The effect of patent regimes on launch incentives
may not be independent of the degree of price regulation in a country. In the extreme
case where price controls bring prices down to unit cost, patent protection would not
provide any incentive for launch. In less extreme cases, we would expect the incentives
provided by patent protection to be reduced as compared to an unregulated market. To
investigate this, we interact the dummy for price regulation with the two extremes of
patent regimes in our data, Short_Process and Long_Product.26 The results in column 5
25Even if regulatory standards are low, a drug may not be launched due to specific regulatory practices that raise the
cost of entry, such as a country requiring that clinical trials be conducted on its own residents before approving the drug.
26We also tried interacting price regulation with Medium_Process and Medium_Product, but these two patent regimes
are highly correlated in the sample (very few countries have long product patents without long process patents), and the
results were not clear-cut. We do not interact price regulation with Short_Product or Long_Process as neither of these
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provide some evidence that price controls strongly dilute the incentive effects of patent
protection. In the absence of price regulation, the point estimates of Short_Process and
Long_Product on the launch hazard are both about 0.33 and highly significant. When
there is strong price regulation, the impact of Short_Process falls essentially to zero (the
estimate is -0.04, and the test on the sum of coefficients does not reject the null of zero,
p-value=0.63), while for Long_Product it declines by about 40 percent to 0.20 but is
still strongly significant (p-value<0.001). These results highlight the importance of tak-
ing the interactions between policy instruments into account in designing overall policy
strategy for pharmaceuticals.
Finally, we investigate how indigenous process innovation capacity affects the timing
of drug launches. Even with product patent protection, an innovator firm may not expect
high enough profits to justify launching a drug in some countries. But a licensee (or, in
the absence of a product patent, an imitator) with a sufficient cost advantage may be able
to cover launch costs. Indeed, a common avenue for competitive entry in some countries
is for indigenous firms to innovate on the drug manufacturing process—typically through
expertise in chemical engineering. Our data do not unambiguously identify whether
products are launched in a country by the product innovator or a competitor, so we cannot
directly examine the role of competitive entry. Instead, we construct a proxy to capture
local technical capacity to do process innovation, using the country’s cumulated stock of
patents in fields related to chemical engineering and manufacturing in each year (see the
Online Appendix for details), and test how this affects the timing of launches.
When we add this control (column 6), the estimated parameters on the patent and
price control regimes and other covariates are robust. This shows that the observed pol-
icy regimes are not simply proxies for having a strong local R&D capability (which
might in turn influence which policies are adopted). The point estimate on the stock of
chemical patents is positive and statistically significant, indicating that countries with
greater capacity for process innovation (and presumably manufacturing capability) have
somewhat faster drug launches. This points to a potentially important role for indige-
nous entry, and highlights the need for process patent protection in countries with local
technical capacity, especially where product patent rights are absent or ineffective.
VI. Endogenous Policy Regimes
In this section we address the potential endogeneity of patent and price control regimes.
Previous studies have treated policy regimes as exogenous. However policy choices are
outcomes of a political process, and are thus likely to reflect unobserved country-specific
factors that may also affect the timing of new drug launches—e.g., variation in insti-
tutional quality and policy enforcement that affect profitability.27 If these unobserved
factors are correlated with observed policy regimes, the estimated effects will be biased.
variables entered significantly in the baseline regression.
27Reverse causality—where launch lags drive regime choice—is hard to rationalize in our context. Regime choice
might be negatively correlated with past launch lags—long delays might induce governments to introduce more attractive
policy regimes—but whether this induces endogeneity bias depends heavily on the assumed structure of errors in the
launch and regime choice equations.
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For example, firms have greater incentives to lobby for strong patent rights where en-
try is more profitable, which would lead us to over-estimate the effect of patent rights
on the speed of diffusion. However, the endogeneity bias can also go the other way—
countries with weak enforcement may be more willing to adopt the appearance of strong
patent rights, inducing negative covariance of patent rights with the disturbance and thus
a downward bias.. However, patent reform is often a condition of entry into new political
groups (e.g., joining the European Union), and international trade agreements such as
TRIPS (Sell (2003)), and thus arguably exogenous. This is less likely to apply to price
controls, where governments typically have greater flexibility.
We begin by testing the null hypothesis that various policy regimes are independent
of the error term in the launch equation, using the Rivers and Vuong (1988)approach.
The tests strongly rejects exogeneity both for price controls and the process patent and
product patent regimes (p-values<0.001).28 In view of these tests, we adopt two iden-
tification strategies to address endogeneity. The first exploits within-country changes
in policy regimes to identify the effects of interest. A significant number of countries
changed patent and/or price control regimes at least once during the sample period, and
15-40 percent of total variance in the policy variables is in the within-country dimension
(see Table A.2 in the Online Appendix.) If the unobserved heterogeneity is constant
over time for a given country, introducing country fixed effects into the hazard model
will deliver consistent estimates.
However, it seems quite likely that these unobserved factors might evolve over time, in
which case the fixed effects approach will not provide consistent estimates of the policy
effects. To allow for this possibility, we adopt a second approach based on instrumen-
tal variables. This approach requires instruments that are correlated with policy choices
but do not directly affect the timing of drug launches (and are plausibly uncorrelated
with unobserved heterogeneity). In the estimates presented below we use various sets
of instruments based on measures of a country’s political institutions, legal system and
ethnolinguistic diversity (which are unlikely to affect drug launches) and the number of
regional trade agreements it has entered (which we include as a proxy for pro-market ori-
entation of a country’s institutions).29 The Online Appendix provides details of variables
and sources.
We implement both these approaches using a semiparametric specification of the haz-
ard function (Lillard (1993)) that allows for a flexible form of the baseline hazard, as well
as implementation of an IV approach using FIML joint estimation of the hazard equation
with ‘first stage’ equations that model policy variables as a function of the instruments.
In this setup, we introduce correlation between the disturbances in the launch and policy
28We first estimate regressions for the choice of policy regimes, including all controls from the baseline specification
of the hazard model plus a set of instrumental variables described in the text below (we conduct the tests both using the
narrow and broad instrument sets). We use a Probit for price controls and Ordered Probits for the short, medium and long
process and product patent regimes. The instruments are jointly significant in these policy choice regressions (p-values
<0.001). The generalized residuals from these regressions are added to the hazard model, and exogeneity is tested by the
significance of the coefficients on the associated generalized residuals.
29If trade openness makes markets more profitable to enter, there could be correlation between the regional trade
agreement instrument (RTA) and the error term in the launch equation. However, the IV results presented below show
that the parameter estimates are robust to whether or not RTA is included in the instrument set.
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regime equations by adding a common random country effect in each equation.30
Table 5 summarizes parameter estimates for the policy variables in the hazard equation
(the coefficients on control variables are not reported, for brevity). Column 1 is the
baseline hazard model using this semiparametric specification—the estimates are very
similar to those from the Weibull specification.31 In column 2 we allow for country
random effects, and obtained estimated coefficients on most of the policy variables which
are very similar to the estimates in column 1. The estimates in column 2 confirm that the
differences between the IV estimates (presented next) and the baseline estimates are not
due to the inclusion of the country random effect. In column 3 we introduce country fixed
effects, identifying the policy effects off the time series variation in launch lags within
countries (column 3).32 A Hausman test strongly rejects the random effects specification
against the alternative of fixed effects, which confirms that the unobserved factors are
correlated with observed policy regimes (p-value < .001).
Overall, the estimates confirm that price controls and, with some qualification, patent
policies significantly affect the timing of drug launches. The parameter estimates for
price controls, short and medium duration process patents, and long product patents are
actually larger than the baseline specification which treats policy regimes as exogenous,
indicating a negative endogeneity bias. As before, we find no significant effect of short
product patents. However the coefficient on long process patents turns negative and sig-
nificant, the coefficient on medium product patents loses significance and the Propatent
index is negative and significant. Note, however, that these fixed effects estimates are
consistent only under the rather strong assumption that the unobserved country-level
heterogeneity is constant over time, which we believe is unlikely, and these anomalous
results are reversed when we use instrumental variables, which we turn to next.
To account for the possibility of time-varying, correlated heterogeneity, in columns
4 and 5 we present the FIML (IV) estimates using two sets of instruments.33 In the
first model we use a minimal set of instruments which contains measures of two impor-
tant aspects of a country’s political institutions: Political_Constraints, which measures
the degree to which voting rights within the political structure constrains policy change,
which is used in the political science literature as a proxy for credible policy commit-
ment; and Executive_Orientation, coded as a right, left or center party with respect to
its orientation on economic policy. In the second model, we expand the instrument set
30In the absence of such correlation, the regimes would not be endogenous in the launch equation (which the Rivers-
Vuong test rejected). We adopt the Lillard framework because we were unable to get nonlinear GMM estimation with
the Weibull model to converge. With time-varying covariates, the data form a large unbalanced panel in which each
observation in the GMM objective function (observed launch status minus predicted in the final period) is conditional
on the entire history of each drug-country up to the last period observed, making the selection of valid instruments very
challenging.
31The duration-dependent part of the hazard function is modeled using year dummies for t 2 [0; 9] and t > 9. Esti-
mated coefficients on these time dummies imply a pattern of duration dependence consistent with a Weibull distribution
with slope parameter of about 0.6, through to about 12 years.
32To avoid computational problems in this non-linear context, covariates that are essentially fixed over time were
dropped. The criterion we use is whether within-country variation accounts for less than 5 percent of the total. The
variables dropped are population, GDP per capita, health expenditures per GDP, Gini, and fraction of the population over
65.
33Details of the parameter estimates for the policy regime equations are provided in the Online Appendix.
VOL. NO. GLOBAL DIFFUSION OF NEW DRUGS 23
by including: Ethnolinguistic_diversity, commonly used in the economics and political
science literature as an indicator of difficulty in reaching and committing to political
decisions; Legal_Origin which is coded as common law, French law, German law, or
Socialist/Other; and RTA which is the cumulative number of regional trade agreements
that the country has entered. Very similar results were obtained without RTA, and for
other combinations of these instruments.
Three main conclusions stand out. First, as with country fixed effect regressions, the
coefficients on price controls and patent regimes are generally larger than those obtained
when the policy regimes as treated as exogenous. If endogeneity were driven by unob-
served heterogeneity in the profitability of markets, we would expect an upward bias.
To the contrary, our findings suggest that the endogeneity bias is more consistent with
negative correlation between the adoption of strong policy regimes and unmeasured as-
pects of political and legal institutions, such as enforcement of patent rights. Second, the
pattern of policy impacts is similar to what we found in the earlier regressions. Process
patents raise the hazard of launch (i.e., reduce launch lags), and the impact increases with
the duration of such patents. Note in particular that the negative effect of long process
patents found in the fixed effects specification is reversed here. Again, as before, we find
that Medium_Product and Long_Product have large impacts on launch lags, while short
product patents have little effect. Third, the estimates are generally similar using both
the narrow and broader sets of instruments (the main exception is the coefficient on short
process patents in column 5.)
VII. Policy Simulations
In this section we illustrate how different policy choices affect the speed of drug dif-
fusion. The metric we adopt is the predicted time it takes for 25 percent of drugs to be
launched (LAG25) under different counterfactual policy regimes. Using our estimated
parameters, we solve for the value of the 25th percentile of the estimated ‘failure’ func-
tion for each drug/country observation, conditional on covariates, and then examine the
median value across observations.34 We begin with a benchmark computation of LAG25
for a regime with no patent protection or price regulation, and then introduce three coun-
terfactual policy regimes: short process patents, long product patents, and price controls.
Table 6 shows results both for all drugs and the subset of FDA approved drugs, and then
for low, middle and high income countries.
Panel A of Table 6 is based on the baseline Weibull regression estimates from column
4 of Table 3 which, as discussed in the previous section, likely underestimate the impact
of policy choices on launch lags. The results further confirm our descriptive findings that
diffusion of new drugs is slow, and varies across drug and income categories.35 In the
benchmark case with no patents or price controls, it takes 4.63 years for 25 percent of
34To do this, we set the values of the time-varying covariates at their sample means (over time) for each drug/country
observation. We focus on the median value of L AG25 because many drugs are never launched in a number of countries,
so the distribution of L AG25 is sharply skewed.
35Although similar to the numbers in Table 2, note that these figures are not directly comparable since they control
for economic and demographic variables, drug therapeutic class, and set the patent and price controls policy variables to
counterfactual values.
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drugs to be launched in the pooled sample. This falls to 3.01 years for FDA approved
drugs, which is good news from a welfare perspective. But there is substantial varia-
tion across income categories—the median lags are more than three times longer in low
income countries (8.85 years) as compared to high income countries (2.60 years).
Setting the patent regime to short process patents only (i.e., Short_Process =1 and price
controls and all other patent variables =0) reduces predicted launch lags by about 25 per-
cent. Slightly shorter launch lags are estimated for a regime with no process patents but
long product patents (and no price controls). Introducing price controls in a regime with
no patents increases lag times by 29 percent above the benchmark. Recall that given the
functional form of the baseline empirical model, the percentage effects of these policy
regimes are additive: thus introducing both price controls and long product patents gen-
erates a predicted median value of LAG25 of 4.09 years. In other words, price regulation
removes most of accelerated diffusion induced by long product patents.
Panel B presents the median predicted launch lags when we use the FIML parameter
estimates on the policy variables, which take into account the endogeneity of policy
regimes.36 Using these coefficients, product patents emerge as much more effective than
process patents (69 percent reduction in launch lags compared to 29 percent), and price
regulation has a very large impact, more than doubling launch lags.
In both panels, the same pattern of results holds for the subset of FDA approved drugs,
and for low, middle, and high income countries. In low income countries, LAG25 is
depressingly high in the benchmark case, at almost nine years. Notice that, based on
these results, a policy regime directed solely at lowering prices on drugs that have been
already been launched (no patents, and strong price controls) would increase launch lags
very substantially to over three times longer than in a ‘pro-innovator’ regime with no
price controls and long product patents.
Several qualifications should be kept in mind. First, these calculations are not a wel-
fare assessment of different regimes—this would require, at a minimum, consideration
of how these policies affect drug prices. This is difficult unless one can model both
the demand side—as a practical matter, this requires restricting the analysis to specific
classes of drugs (e.g., Chaudhuri, Goldberg and Gia (2006))—and the supply side, i.e.,
the investment required for launch. One would also need to address how to evaluate the
relative welfare gains from incremental versus radical innovation in this context. If gains
associated with increased product variety and incremental quality improvements were
relatively small, and if policy regimes primarily affected diffusion of such follow-on
products, the overall welfare impact might not be as severe as Table 6 suggests.
Second, because our empirical model is not structural, counterfactual assessment of
policies is subject to the Lucas critique, among other issues. A third, related, point is that
countries develop institutions and invest in human capital over long time periods, and in
ways that both influence, and in turn are influenced by, the policy regimes they adopt.
Thus there may be important path dependencies driving observed outcomes—and the
estimated policy impacts shown here may take many years to unfold. Any assessment of
36Specifically we recompute the predicted launch lags from the Weibull model after substituting the coefficients on
the patent and price controls variables with values from the FIML estimates in column 4 of Table 5.
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a new policy regime needs to take into account the capacity of the country to adapt and
the costs of doing so.
VIII. Concluding Remarks
This paper studies how patent rights and price regulation affect launch lags for new
drugs. Using new data on launches of 642 new molecules in 76 countries during 1983-
2002, we show that, all else equal, longer and more extensive patent protection strongly
accelerated diffusion, while price regulation delayed it. Health policy institutions, and
economic factors that make markets more profitable, also sped up diffusion. These re-
sults hold both for developing countries and high income countries, and the results are
robust to using instrumental variables and country fixed effects to address the endogene-
ity of policy regimes.
Of course, the same policies that promote faster launch—stronger patent rights and
the absence of price regulation—are also those that raise prices. This highlights the
basic tradeoff countries face between making new drug therapies available and making
them affordable. Finding ways to mitigate the adverse effects of this tradeoff remains a
major challenge. One possible approach would be to introduce multilateral recognition
of drug trials and regulatory approval, lowering launch costs and speeding up global drug
diffusion. Finally, our findings highlight the broader point, not limited to pharmaceuti-
cals, that patent rights can have an important impact on the diffusion of new innovations
as well as on the rate at which new innovations are created.
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TABLE 3—WEIBULL MODEL OF DRUG LAUNCH: PROPORTIONAL HAZARD COEFFICIENTS.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Elapsed time 0.614** 0.618** 0.611** 0.611**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Price Controls -0.153** -0.171** -0.140** -0.153**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
Short_Process 0.117 0.175** 0.180** 0.179**
(0.065) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067)
Medium_Process 0.199** 0.171** 0.159** 0.164**
(0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055)
Long_Process 0.017 0.031 0.004 0.053
(0.063) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060)
Short_Product 0.130* 0.020 -0.064 -0.019
(0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
Medium_Product 0.077 0.174** 0.142** 0.130**
(0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042)
Long_Product 0.335** 0.303** 0.260** 0.229**
(0.058) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055)
Propatent Index 0.372** 0.169** 0.154** 0.220**
(0.051) (0.052) (0.054) (0.056)
Log(population) 0.074** 0.076** 0.077** 0.083**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log(GDP/cap) 0.247** 0.023 0.015 0.048*
(0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.023)
Log(Health/GDP) 0.313** 0.259** 0.275**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
FDA Approved drug 1.357** 1.375** 1.355** 0.540**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.065)
Gini Coefficient 0.014** 0.012**
(0.001) (0.001)
% Pop Age 65+ 0.026** 0.024**
(0.003) (0.003)
BQ*FDA drug -0.001
(0.001)
BQ*non-FDA drug -0.012**
(0.001)
Rule of Law index 0.001
(0.011)
National Drug Policy 0.028 0.009
(0.032) (0.032)
Essential Drug List 0.189** 0.204**
(0.032) (0.033)
National Formulary 0.098** 0.093**
(0.027) (0.027)
ATC Dummies YES YES YES YES
No. Observations 298,605 298,605 298,605 298,605
log-likelihood -45,413 -45,237 -45,122 -45,034
Note: * significant at 5 percent and ** significant at 1 percent. Standard errors clustered on country-drug in parentheses.
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TABLE 4—WEIBULL MODEL OF DRUG LAUNCH: ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Drug
Random
Effects
Level 2
Therap.
Class
Effects
FDA
Approved
drugs
Low/
Middle
Income
Interactions
of Patents
with Price
Controls
Local
Innovation
Capacity
Price Controls -0.214** -0.157** -0.181** -0.205** -0.040 -0.147**
(0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.029) (0.037) (0.019)
Short_Process 0.185** 0.168* 0.134 0.172* 0.325** 0.171*
(0.068) (0.067) (0.075) (0.079) (0.073) (0.067)
Medium_Process 0.138* 0.163** 0.140* 0.188** 0.174** 0.156**
(0.057) (0.054) (0.061) (0.062) (0.055) (0.055)
Long_Process 0.019 0.049 0.037 0.034 0.025 0.046
(0.062) (0.060) (0.066) (0.068) (0.061) (0.061)
Short_Product -0.023 -0.006 -0.048 -0.017 -0.015 -0.028
(0.067) (0.066) (0.073) (0.076) (0.066) (0.066)
Medium_Product 0.175** 0.144** 0.112* 0.064 0.144** 0.131**
(0.044) (0.041) (0.046) (0.047) (0.042) (0.042)
Long_Product 0.279** 0.239** 0.191** 0.241** 0.328** 0.232**
(0.057) (0.054) (0.059) (0.074) (0.061) (0.055)
Short_Process x -0.368**
Price Controls (0.080)
Long_Product x -0.124**
Price Controls (0.043)
Propatent Index 0.370** 0.229** 0.231** -0.036 0.220** 0.187**
(0.054) (0.055) (0.061) (0.096) (0.055) (0.057)
Stock of Chemicals 0.014**
Patents (0.005)
log-likelihood -38,903 -43,681 -35,101 -20,602 -45023 -45030
Note: * significant at 5 percent and ** significant at 1 percent. Standard errors clustered on country-drug in parenthe-
ses. 298,605 observations, except for columns 3 and 4 which have 163,853 and 168,684 observations respectively. All
equations also include the other explanatory variables in column 4 of Table 3.
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TABLE 5—HAZARD MODEL OF DRUG LAUNCH WITH ENDOGENOUS POLICY REGIMES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Country
Random
Effect
Country
Fixed
Effects
IVs: Political
Constraints,
Executive
Orientation
+ Ethno-
Linguistic
Diversity,
Legal Origins,
No. of RTAs
Price Controls -0.155** -0.189** -0.181** -0.491** -0.566**
(0.020) (0.023) (0.042) (0.025) (0.026)
Short_Process 0.143** 0.151** 0.284* 0.211** 0.098
(0.065) (0.074) (0.186) (0.067) (0.068)
Medium_Process 0.121** 0.105* 0.193** 0.344** 0.269**
(0.053) (0.057) (0.076) (0.053) (0.051)
Long_Process 0.026 -0.118 -0.287** 0.431** 0.313**
(0.053) (0.078) (0.089) (0.059) (0.059)
Short_Product -0.032 0.021 0.148 0.031 0.009
(0.065) (0.075) (0.225) (0.068) (0.068)
Medium_Product 0.156** 0.142** 0.051 0.425** 0.362**
(0.041) (0.044) (0.066) (0.041) (0.040)
Long_Product 0.173** 0.311** 0.461** 0.721** 0.639**
(0.054) (0.065) (0.078) (0.051) (0.054)
Propatent Index 0.147** 0.164** -0.230 0.211** 0.170**
(0.056) (0.068) (0.129) (0.058) (0.057)
log-likelihood -90,666 -86,631 -90,058 -605,230 -585,949
Note: * significant at 5 percent and ** significant at 1 percent. Standard errors clustered on country-drug in parenthe-
ses. 298,605 observations, except for columns 3 and 4 which have 163,853 and 168,684 observations respectively. All
equations also include the other explanatory variables in column 4 of Table 3.
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TABLE 6—IMPACT OF POLICY REGIMES ON LAUNCH LAGS
All Drugs FDA
Approved
drugs
Low
income
countries
Middle
income
countries
High
income
countries
Benchmark 4.63 3.01 8.85 4.91 2.60
Panel A: Median lag to predicted 25 percent diffusion using baseline coefficients
Regime 1: Short_Process 3.45 2.25 6.61 3.67 1.94
Regime 2: Long_Product 3.18 2.07 6.09 3.38 1.79
Regime 3: Price controls 5.95 3.87 11.38 6.31 3.35
Panel B: Median lag to predicted 25 percent diffusion using FIML coefficients on policy variables
Regime 1: Short_Process 3.28 2.13 6.27 3.48 1.84
Regime 2: Long_Product 1.42 0.93 2.72 1.51 0.80
Regime 3: Price controls 10.34 6.73 19.77 10.98 5.82
No. observations 38,180 26,319 3,350 17,976 16,854
Note: Table entries are median values of 38,180 drug-country observations on the 25th percentile of the estimated Weibull
failure function. In Panel A the parameters for this calculation are the estimated coefficients from the Weibull model in
Table 3, column 4, and in Panel B they are the estimated coefficients on policy variables from Table 5, column 4.
